 Abstract
In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good Corporate governance
. We provide robust empirical evidence consistent with the fact that firms with high internal governance are more efficiently run. We empirically label as 'independent from the CEO' a top executive who joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit (1) a lower level of profitability and (2) lower shareholder returns after large acquisitions. These results are unaffected when we control for traditional governance measures such as board independence or other well-studied shareholder-friendly provisions.
Authors:
Landier, Augustin & Sraer, David & THESMAR, David
(2006)
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Bottom-Up Corporate Governance
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/5500.html
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