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| The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring | |
 Abstract
We study finite zero-sum Stochastic
games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, at each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the state and his/her own action. We prove that the uniform max-min value always exists. Moreover, the uniform max-min value is independent of the information structure of player 2. Symmetric results hold for the uniform min-max value. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003
Authors:
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2003)
Download locations
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v32y2003i1p133-150.html
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