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Nicolas VIEILLE
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 Related authors
 LARAKI, Rida
SOLAN, Eilon
GOSSNER, Olivier
ROSENBERG, Dinah
| | Working papers and articles: (60)
 Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons 
Johannes Hoerner & Nicolas VIEILLE
(2006)
On A Markov Game with Incomplete Information
Johannes Horner & Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2006)
Informational externalities and convergence of behavior
VIEILLE, Nicolas
& ROSENBERG, Dinah
& SOLAN, Eilon
(2006)
Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2004)
Timing Games with Informational Externalities
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2004)
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2003)
Strategic learning in games with symmetric information
GOSSNER, Olivier
& VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2003)
Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games
SOLAN, Eilon
& VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2003)
Equilibrium Uniqueness with Perfect Complements
Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2003)
Continuous-time Games of Timing
Rida LARAKI
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2003)
Stochastic games: Recent results
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2002)
Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems
VIEILLE, Nicolas
& Weibull, Jörgen W. (2002)
Majority vote following a debate
VIEILLE, Nicolas
& GILBOA, Itzhak (2002)
Random walks and voting theory
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2002)
Stopping games: recent results
Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Stochastic Games with a Single Controller and Incomplete Information
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Approximating a Sequence of Approximations by a Simple Process
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
How to play with a biased coin?
GOSSNER, Olivier
& VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2002)
Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
SOLAN, Eilon
& VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2002)
Two-player games : a reduction
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2001)
On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Eilon SOLAN
& Dinah ROSENBERG
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2001)
An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games
Eran Shmaya & Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2001)
Repeated communication through the mechanism
Olivier GOSSNER
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2001)
Uniform Value in Recursive Games
Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2000)
Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2000)
Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(1999)
Quitting Games
Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(1998)
On Equilibrium on the Square
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(1996)
Conditional Systems Revisited
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(1996)
Stochastic Games with a Single Controler and Incomplete Information 
Perturbed Markov chains
Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Approximating a Sequence of Observations by a Simple Process
VIEILLE, Nicolas
& ROSENBERG, Dinah
& SOLAN, Eilon
(2002)
On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Dinah ROSENBERG
& Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2001)
On a class of recursive games
Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Stopping games and Ramsey theorem
Eran Schmaya & Eilon SOLAN
& Nicolas VIEILLE
(2002)
Stochastic Games : recent results
VIEILLE, Nicolas
(2001)
Quitting games - An example
VIEILLE, Nicolas
& SOLAN, Eilon
(2001)
Stopping games : recent results
"Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information"
"Random walks and voting theory"
"The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring"
"Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games"
"Perturbed Markov Chains"
"Quitting Games: An Example"
"An Application of Ramsey Theorem to Stopping Games"
"Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information"
"Continuous-time Dynkin Games with Mixed Strategies"
"Uniform Value in Recursive Games"
"Blackwell Optimality in Markov Decision Processes with Partial Observation"
"How to Play with a Biased Coin"
"Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games"
"Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism and"
"Quitting Games"
"Stopping Games With Randomized Strategies"
"Small Perturbations and Stochastic Games"
"Two-player Stochastic Games II: The Case of Recursive Games"
"Two-player Stochastic Games I: A Reduction"
"Solvable States in N-player Stochastic Games"
"The Maxmin of Recursive games with Incomplete Information on One Side"
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